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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal jurisdiction is a matter of first importance under our Con-
stitution for federal tribunals are limited courts of a limited sover-
• A preliminary version of this essay appeared at 11 LmGATION, Spring 1985, at 17; this
revised and expanded version is published with the permission of the American Bar
Association.
•• Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. B.S. cum laude. 1974, Florida State Uni-
versity; J.D. with high honors, 1977, The University of Florida. On leave 1985-86, Judicial
Fellow, Supreme Court of the United States. The views expressed herein are those of the
author alone.
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eign.l Today, as has been true since the earliest days of our Republic,
before a federal court may deign to decide, the case or controversy
must be determined to fall both within the article III empowerment
and within some particular enabling act of Congress.2 Thus this
threshold principle takes on controlling importance.3 The party in-
voking the federal power must affirmatively rebut a presumption
against jurisdiction.4 Not only the party resisting jurisdiction but the
court sua sponte must raise any jurisdictional issue, as well.S This
goes so far as to allow the party invoking the federal jurisdiction to
challenge that jurisdiction when the result does not satisfy him.6 In a
regime in which every actor must invoke the jurisdictional bar, is it
any wonder that so many suits fail?
In this essay, I assume that the decision to get into or stay in federal
court has been made, for whatever reason. My effort here is to pro-
vide a checklist of some of the typical challenges to jurisdiction and to
highlight some uncommon responses. Organizationally, I will first
consider general issues which apply to all cases, then I will consider
1. "Before a federal court exercises any governmental power, it has a duty to determine
its own jurisdiction to act." Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 653 (1982) (Stevens, J., con-
curring); see also Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.) (Court
disclaims all jurisdiction not conferred by Constitution or statute).
2. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 442 (1849) (statute may restrict jurisdiction
of congressionally created lower federal courts); Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)
303, 304 (1809) (constitutional subject matter limitations cannot be enlarged by statute). See
generally Hill & Baker, Dam Federal Jurisdiction!, 32 EMORY L.J. 3, 3-7 (1983) (constitu-
tional and statutory grants of jurisdiction discussed).
3. See Turner v. President, Directors and Co. of Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dam.)
8, 10-11 (1799) (record must affirmatively show federal jurisdiction); see also C. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7, at 22-23 (4th ed. 1983) (federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction).
4. See McNatt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1935) (incum-
bent on plaintiff to allege jurisdictional facts).
5. See Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Motley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (duty of court to see
that circuit court did not exceed its jurisdiction); Cameron v. Hodges, 127 U.S. 322, 325 (1888)
(federal court on its own motion ~ust dismiss for lack of jurisdiction).
6. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 n.21 (1978) (when
party disclosed lack of complete diversity in course of trial there was no jurisdiction regardless
of inequity); American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 18 (1951) (defendant who removed
case and successfully resisted remand may challenge jurisdiction after judgment for plaintiff);
Santos v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 618 F.2d 575, 577 (9th Cir. 1980) (subject matter jurisdiction may
be raised for first time on appeal). But see generally Dobbs, The Decline 0/ Jurisdiction by
Consent, 40 N.C.L. REv. 49, 51-62 (1961) (criticizing the refusal offederal courts to recognize
jurisdiction by consent to avoid inequity); Morse, Judicial Self-Denial and Judicial Activism:
The Personality o/the Original Jurisdiction o/the District Courts, 3 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 7, 10-
30 (1954) (advocating federal jurisdiction by consent).
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separately some issues in diversity cases and in federal question cases,
the two most important heads of federal jurisdiction. My format lik-
ens a federal proceduralist to a fencer. Indeed, I believe that tech-
nique and art should characterize each "thrust" and "parry" over the
issues whether the federal court has power to hear the controversy
and whether that power should be exercised in the particular
instance.'
II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
THRUST: Plaintiff has no standing.8
PARRY: Standing rarely becomes an issue in private litigation.
The victim of some contract breach or some tort may bring suit and
his standing to raise the claim is obvious. In public law litigation by
contrast, when a plaintiff challenges some governmental action, an-
swering the question whether the person bringing suit is more than a
mere bystander is as difficult as it is important. Public law standing
doctrine divides taxpayers from others, not as if there is such a person
as a nontaxpayer (they become defendants in another kind of case),
but in terms of the interest on which the suit is based.
A taxpayer has standing qua taxpayer if the federal action being
challenged is an exercise of the congressional spending power and if
the federal action allegedly exceeds a specific constitutional limit on
that power.9 Thus, even a federal taxpayer can have standing. The
category is admittedly narrow and is controlled by constitutional
principles. For example, a taxpayer can attack a program of federal
religious school aid as a violation of the establishment clause,1O but
7. See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory 0/Appellate Decision and the Rules or Cannons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAN. L. REv. 395,401 (1950) (classic application
of thrust and parry format).
8. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (standing focuses on party seekingjurisdic-
tion not on issues to be adjudicated). But cf. Allen v. Wright, _ U.S. -0-0 104 S. Ct.
3315,3325,82 L. Ed. 2d556, 570-71 (1984) (Court examines both party and issue in determin-
ing standing); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106-07 n.7, n.8 (1983) (both com-
plaint and party examined to establish standing).
9. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968) (two prong nexus test met when taxpay-
ers challenged specific congressional expenditure as exceeding establishment clause limitation).
See generally Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601,601-28 (1968)
(discussing Flast opinion and its ramifications); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court - A Func-
tional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 645, 645-49 (1973) (discussing erosion of standing doctrine
in Supreme Court decisions).
10. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-05 (1968) (standing established when federal
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cannot challenge the same program under either the due process
clause or the tenth amendment. II Local plaintiffs, however, may
claim standing more easily as taxpayers challenging local expendi-
tures. 12 This approach should not be overlooked.
A nontaxpayer challenging some government action can have
standing, if he shows some actual or threatened injury which is caused
by the action which will be redressed by a favorable decision. 13 In-
jury, causation, and redressability are all that the Constitution re-
quires. 14 However, nontaxpayer standing seems more difficult to
appropriations under article I, section 8 used to finance parochial schools attacked as violation
of Establishment Clause).
11. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974) (no
standing as taxpayer to reclaim reserve pay from members of Congress); United States v. Rich-
ardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974) (no standing as taxpayer to challenge CIA accounting proce-
dures); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-06 (1968) (tenth amendment not limitation on
'Congress' spending powers); see also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 478-79 (1982) (no standing as taxpayer to
challenge disposition of property to religious school under article IV, section 3). See generally
Note, Recent Standing Cases and a Possible Alternative Approach. 27 HASTINGS L.J. 213
(1975) (discussing Richardson and Schlesinger opinions restrictive view of Flast).
12. See. e.g.. Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 185-86 (1952) (citizen and taxpayer
brought suit to enforce Oklahoma loyalty oath); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 489
(1952) (New York subversive teacher statute challenged by local taxpayers); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,5-6 (1947) (New Jersey parochial school transportation challenge by local
school taxpayers).
13. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (three part standing test oS article III minimum); see
also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80-81 (1978)
(organizations and residents had standing to challenge constitutionality of Price-Anderson
Act). See generally Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence ofArticle Ill: Perspectives on the "Case and
Controversy Requirement", 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 305-22 (1979) (outlining and discussing the
constitutional requirements of standing).
14. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (each criteria must be satisfied); see also City of Los Ange-
les v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 99 (1983) (redressability factor unsatisfied); Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-46 (1976) (causation and redressabilty factors
unsatisfied); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1976) (redressability factor unsatisfied); cf.
also Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, 454 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1981) (redres-
sability established); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59,
78 (1978) (no requirement to negate speculative possibilities to establish redressability); Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261-63
(1977) (specific injury to non-profit corporation establishes standing).
Causation and redressability have sometimes been considered two methods of stating the
same fact - that an alleged injury must be traced to the plaintiff - but they should be treated
as distinct requirements. Compare Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978) (Court states redressability part of causation) with Watt v. Energy
Action Educational Found., 454 U.S. 150, 160 (1981) (causation and redressability addressed
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establish these days. IS
My reader should distinguish nonconstitutional, prudential princi-
ples of standing doctrine which are frequently invoked and almost as
frequently excused. Because they are mere creatures of judicial. re-
straint, a court feeling unrestrained may pay them only lip service.
When they are the "thrust," the "parry" may be either that they are
satisfied or that they should be excused. There are three prudential
principles. First, the plaintiff's own interest must come within the
"zone of interest" protected by the statute invoked. 16 Plaintiff can
find this requirement in legislative intent l7 or use the requirement's
inherent ambiguity to make a bold assertion of satisfaction. 18 Second,
the courts will not hear "generalized grievances" commonly shared
by everyone. 19 The "parry," of course, is to convince the court that
the plaintiff's grievance is particularized.20 Third, a prudential rule
as distinct article III requirements). See generally Nichol, Causation as a Standing Require-
ment: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 Ky. L.J. 185, 191-99 (1981) ("[a] sub-
stantial correlation exists between the concerns for directness of injury and redressability (but]
both their aims and modes of analysis are distinct.")
IS. See Allen v. Wright, _ U.S. _, _,104 S. Ct. 3315, 3328, 82 L. Ed. 556, 571
(1984) (no standing for claim that children's education impaired by integrated school because
injury not traceable to challenged government act); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
111 (1983) (no standing because whether the same plaintiff would be injured again was
speculative).
16. See Barow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970) (without discussion Court held tenant
farmers within zone of interests intended by act); Association of Data Processing Servo Organi-
zations V. Camp, 397 U.S. ISO, 153-54 (1970) (interest may include both economic and
noneconomic injuries within zone intended to be protected).
17. See Havens Realty Corp. V. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982) (congressional
omission in statute examined to establish standing); see also Currie, Judicial Review Under the
Federal Pollution Laws. 62 IOWA L. REV. 1221, 1271-80 (1977) (analyzing statutory standing
under Clean Air Act).
18. See Control Data Corp. V. Baldridge, 655 F.2d 283, 288-91 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (plain-
tift's contention requires court to apply zone of interest test); Marshall & Isley Corp. V. Hei-
mann, 652 F.2d 685, 693-98 (7th Cir. 1981) (zone of interest test applied separately to each
statute).
19. See Scheslinger V. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 224-27 (1974)
(incompatibility claim not particularized injury); United States V. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
176-78 (1974) (general interest in CIA accounts insufficient standing allegation). See generally
Note, The Generalized Grievance Restriction: Prudential Restraint or Constitutional Mandate?
70 GEO. L.J. 1157, 1170-79 (1982) (discussion of grievance shared with citizenry at large as a
bar to standing).
20. Cf Valley Forge Christian College V. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 489 (1982) (rejecting argument that if this plaintiff does not have
standing no one does); United States V. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-78 (1974) (citizens
interest in lawful conduct by CIA generalized); Scheslinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
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allows a plaintiff to assert only his own and not some third party's
legal interests.21 The "parry" is the exception allowing representa-
tional standing, an exception of near swallowing proportions.22 To
say that the third rule has been markedly relaxed may be an under-
statement.23 Any person involved in a relationship which is affected
by the challenged government action likely will be allowed to proceed
under the representational standing theory.24 Litigation surrogates
also may be created as, for example, when a not-for-profit corporation
sues on behalf of its members.2s
This is the important point to observe here and elsewhere in federal
jurisdiction: the exceptions to the rules have themselves become
War, 418 U.S. 208, 224 (1974) (belief in lawful conduct by Congressmen common to public at
large).
21. See Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (physician seeking declaration of un-
constitutionality of contraceptive regulation could not rely on his patient's rights). But see
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (physician in criminal prosecution had
standing to represent patients). See generally Sedler, The Assertion ofConstitutional Jus Tertii:
A Substantive Approach, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1308 (1982) (review of jus tertii cases).
22. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 343
(1976) (three prong test for representational standing detailed); National Ass'n for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958) (nexus with members
sufficient for organization to act as representative); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 183-87 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (appropriate for representa-
tive to vindicate members' rights). See generally Baker, Constitutional Law, 27 LoY. L. REv.
805, 807 (1981) (general discussion of representational standing).
23. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (seller asserts rights
of potential customers); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (female vendor permitted to assert
rights of underage males); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (physician asserts patients'
abortion rights). See generally Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L.
REv. 423 (1974) (distinguishes jus tertii from statutory overbreath).
24. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13, at 72-73 (4th ed. 1983); see also
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduction Health, Inc., __ U.S. n.30, 103
S. Ct. 2481, 2498 n.30, __ L. Ed. 2d _ n.30 (1983) (physician subject to potential crimi-
nalliability under statute could assert privacy rights of minor: patients).
25. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-40 (1972). While the Supreme Court
held there was no organizational standing, a subsequent amendment to the complaint alleging
how the environmental group's members were suffering harm satisfied the requirement. See
Sierra Club v. Morton, 348 F. Supp. 219, 220 (N.D. Cal. 1972); see also Save Our Wetlands,
Inc. v. Sands, 711 F.2d 634,640 (5th Cir. 1983) (organization had standing to challenge utility
line construction along river bank). Furthermore, a corporation might have standing in its
own right. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (concrete injury to
organization's activities establishes standing); Hudson Valley Freedom Theatre, Inc. v. Heim-
bach, 671 F.2d 702,706 (2d Cir.) (non-profit corporation has standing to assert racial discrimi-
nation), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982). See generally Note, A Corporation of a Different
Color: Hudson Valley Freedom Theatre, Inc. v. Heimbach, 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1179, 1181
(1983) (representative standing may be constructed).
HeinOnline -- 17 St. Mary’s L.J. 245 1985-1986
1986] THINKING ABOUT FEDERAL JURISDICTION 245
means of access to federal court. A good proceduralist uses them to
advantage.
THRUST: The case is moot.26
PARRY: The mootness doctrine is not a talisman requiring dismis-
sal upon invocation. There is always room for some advocacy ex-
plaining how there remains something for the judgment to accomplish
(ie., there is a live case or controversy).27 Alternatively, a commonly
applied exception allows an otherwise moot case to survive if the con-
troversy is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."28 If the chal-
lenged action is of such brief duration as to be completed before the
ordinary run of litigation and there is a reasonable likelihood that the
plaintiff will suffer the same alleged injury again, the case may go
on.29
THRUST: There is no personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
PARRY: Put aside the metaphysics of arguing there really is in
personam, in rem, or quasi in rem jurisdiction.30 Leave out arguments
for individuals of personal service,31 domicile, or consent, and argu-
26. See A.L. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc. v. U.S., 368 U.S. 324, 328 (1961) (when rate
discrimination eliminated before adjudication, prior order vacated rather than dismissed for
mootness); California v. San Pablo & T. R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893) (federal court not
empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions which cannot affect result in case
at bar). See generally Hill & Baker, Dam Federal Jurisdiction!, 32 EMORY L.J. 3, 18 (1983)
(mootness focuses on sequence of events in litigation). The mootness doctrine arises out of
article Ill's "case and controversy" requirement. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,319
(1974). See generally Comment, A Search for Principles ofMootness in the Federal Courts, 54
TEXAS L. REv. 1289, 1295-1302 (1976) (surveying mootness doctrine).
27. See, e.g., Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 630 (1982) (opportunity to plead anew may
avoid mootness); Ridgeway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409, 1411-12 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983) (legal conse-
quences after release from prison prevents mootness); Niles v. University Interscholastic
League, 715 F.2d 1027, 1030 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983) (filing for money damages prevents original
injunctive remedy from becoming moot). See generally Baker, Federal Jurisdiction, 16 TEx.
TECH L. REv. 145, 153-55 (1985) (discussing recent Fifth Circuit decisions).
28. See Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911); see also Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1973) (abortion issue "capable of repetition, yet evading review").
29. See. e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 541 (1976) (expired pretrial
order issue likely to recur); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1973) (natural termination
does not render abortion issue moot); Valley Constr. Co. v. Marsh, 714 F.2d 26,28 (5th Cir.
1983) (present unavailability of contracts does not moot challenge to arbitrary minority pro-
gram). But see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 100-01, 104-05 (1983) (absent
sufficient likelihood same party will be injured again injunction not issued).
30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (process). See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRAcrICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1064-73 (1969) (outlining various challenges).
31. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE: CML
§§ 1064-65, 1094 (1969) (personal jurisdiction and service discussed).
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ments for corporations of state of incorporation, doing business, or
presence.32 Those are all commonplace.33 What about jurisdiction by
default? There is always jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction. A fed-
eral court has the inherent power to consider whether there is juris-
diction over both subject matter and the person.34 The former is both
constitutional and statutory and cannot be garnered by consent,
waiver, or estoppel,3s The latter, however, is part and parcel of due
process liberty. Entering a special appearance to contest personal ju-
risdiction, of course, permits that determination.36 However, the
court may enter a discovery sanction order establishing personal juris-
diction over an obstreperous party who has frustrated discovery ef-
forts to establish jurisdictional facts. 37 This strategy may be too much
of a long shot for a plaintiff to pursue, but a defendant resisting juris-
diction and discovery should take care not to resist too much.
32. See id. §§ 1066-67 (corporation service detailed).
33. The troublesome due process concept of minimum contacts is made more difficult
when the issue becomes what minimum contacts are enough minimum contacts. Compare
Burger King Corp. v. Ruclzewicz, _ U.S. _, _ 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2185-86, 85 L. Ed. 2d
528, 546-47 (1985) (prior negotiations, future consequences, contract terms, and course of
dealings as factors to be considered) with Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State
Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907, 909 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) (minimum contacts not found
despite telephone, mail, and shipment contacts).
There has been some recent reconsideration in the area of alien corporations which may
spill-over into domestic cases. See Note, Diversity Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations. 50 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1458, 1464-66 (1983) (alien corporation may be deemed state citizen for diversity
purposes); Note, Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Jurisdic-
tional Standard, 95 MARV. L. REv. 470 (1981) (proposal to correct jurisdictional immunity for
aliens doing business in United States).
34. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.s. 258, 290 (1947) (court has power
to preserve existing conditions pending a decision on its jurisdiction).
35. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975) (residency requirement for divorce
cannot be waived); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 241-42 (1934) (diversity requirement
cannot be waived to confer jurisdiction); Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382
(1884) (requisite citizenship for jurisdiction must affirmatively appear on record). See gener-
ally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 7, at 23 (4th ed. 1983) (federal courtjurisdic-
tion conferred by Constitution and Congress).
36. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1344
(1969) (special appearance procedure detailed in regard to jurisdiction determination).
37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A); see also Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compa-
gnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694, 709 (1982) (trial court sanction established per-
sonal jurisdiction over foreign insurer). See generally Note, Insurance Corp. ofIreland. Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea: Justifying Establishment of Jurisdiction as a Discovery
Sanction, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1446, 1454-61 (1982) (discusses punitive aspect of sanction and loss
of challenge to jurisdiction).
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THRUST: There is no independent jurisdiction to support joining a
particular claim or party.
PARRY: Once there is a federal jurisdictional anchor, other claims
and other parties may be appended sometimes without an independ-
ent basis, under the related doctrines of ancillary jurisdiction and pen-
dent jurisdiction.38 These doctrines are much too complicated and
subtle to allow for much more than a mention in this format. None-
theless, they should be mentioned because their potential allows
claims and parties into federal court which would never otherwise be
permitted. The underlying policy is that if a federal court has some
jurisdiction over part of a dispute it may have power to reach beyond
its jurisdiction and decide related aspects over which there is no in-
dependent jurisdiction.39 In short, the power to decide a case or con-
troversy is the power to decide the whole dispute.40 The doctrines can
apply in diversity and federal question cases and they may apply to
claims and to parties which neither jurisdiction reaches. Ancillary
jurisdiction applies to claims and parties joined after the complaint by
parties other than the plaintiff.41 Pendent jurisdiction applies to
claims raised by the plaintiff in the complaint.42
38. See Miller, Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 26 S. TEX. L.J. I, 2-5 (1985) (distin-
guishes ancillary and pendent jurisdiction and their availability); see also Baker, Federal Juris-
diction, 16 TEX. TECH L. REv. 145, 148 (1985) (pendent variation raised in complaint and
ancillary raised by other parties after complaint). But see Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 n.8 (1978) (unnecessary to distinguish between pendent and ancil-
lary jurisdiction); cf Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (differences between ancillary
and pendent jurisdiction not addressed).
39. See Baker, Toward a Relaxed View ofFederal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33
U. Prrr. L. REv. 759, 762-69 (1972) (proposal to expand jurisdiction based on fairness, con-
venience, and efficiency); see also Miller, Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 26 S. TEx. L.J. I,
2-5 (1985) (federal court may decide cases not within its usual jurisdiction); Note, A Closer
Look at Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction. 95
HARV. L. REv. 1935 (1982) (proposes structure to determine jurisdiction over incidental
claims).
40. See Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 742 (1824) (court of
original jurisdiction must have power to decide all questions to be effective). See generally
Minahan, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction of United States Federal District Courts, 10
CREIGHTON L. REv. 279, 285-96 (1976) (discusses scope of federal trial court jurisdiction).
41. See, e.g.• Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. I, 11 n.7 (1976) (without ancillary jurisdic-
tion to hear all later claims to property some valid claims may be excluded for diversity rea-
sons); Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609-10 (1926) (compulsory
counterclaim on same property heard after plaintiff's claim dismissed); Freeman v. Howe, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460 (1860) (party whose interests affected by federal court suit may assert
claim regardless of diversity).
42. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (pendent claims arise
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The liberal joinder provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure create the occasion for exercise of these two auxiliary jurisdic-
tions. Complete diversity may not be required for a compulsory
counterclaim under Rule 13(a) even when additional parties are
brought in under Rule 13(h);43 or in an intervention as of right under
Rule 24(a);44 or when a third-party is impleaded under Rule 14;45 or
when a cross-claim is asserted under Rule 13(g),46 as all such claims
may fall under the ancillary power. A plaintiff also may convince a
from common nucleus of operative facts and would be expected to be tried in one proceeding);
Hagans v. Lorine, 415 U.S. 528, 539 (1974) (advantages of convenience and economy in hear-
ing pendent claims); Transource Int'l, Inc. v. Trinity Industries, Inc., 725 F.2d 274, 285 (5th
Cir. 1984) (state antitrust claims heard under pendent jurisdiction after federal claims dis-
missed). But see Laird v. Board of Trustees, 721 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 1983) (pendent
jurisdiction not applicable when unsettled state law questions predominated). See generally
Seid, The Tail Wags the Dog: Hagans v. Lorine and Pendent Jurisdiction. 53 J. URBAN LAW 1
(1975) (severely criticizes Hagans decision).
43. See FED. R. CIY. P. 13(h); see also H. L. Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430,
433-34 (5th Cir. 1967) (independent jurisdiction not necessary when additional party brought
in by counter-claimant); United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Productions, 221 F.2d 213, 216
(2nd Cir. 1955) Gurisdiction extends to additional party when counterclaim compulsory). See
generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 79, at 536 n.63 (4th ed. 1983) (skepticism
about ofjurisdiction unless joinder is compelled under Rule 19); Miller, Ancillary and Pendent
Jurisdiction. 26 S. TEX. L.J. 1, 7 (1985) (ancillary jurisdiction under Federal Rule 13(h) for
compulsory counterclaims discussed).
44. See FED. R. CIY. P. 24(a) (intervention); see also Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 951-
55 (9th Cir. 1977) (four-fold test for intervention of right not met); Gaines v. Dixie Carriers,
Inc., 434 F.2d 52, 54 (5th Cir. 1970) (diversity determined at commencement despite later
changes in parties by intervention). See generally Note, Ancillary Jurisdiction and Intervention
Under Federal Rule 24: Analysis and Proposals. 58 IND. L.J. 111, 112 n.6 (1982). Permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b) does require independent jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIY. P.
24(b); see also Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 955-56 (9th Cir. 1977) (Rule 82 provides that
federal rules not construed to alter jurisdiction); Francis v. Chamber of Commerce of the
United States, 481 F.2d 192, 195 n.6 (4th Cir. 1973) (permissive intervention requires in-
dependent jurisdictional grounds for defense or claim).
45. When a third-party plaintiff and a third-party defendant are co-citizens, jurisdiction is
deemed ancillary to the main claim. When a plaintiff and the third-party defendant are co-
citizens, the same rule applies unless the plaintiff amends the complaint to assert his own claim
against the third-party defendant or the later asserts a counter-claim against the former. See
generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CooPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3523 (1984); Stephens, Ancillary Jurisdiction: Plaintiffs' Claims Against Non-Diverse Third-
Party Defendants. 14 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 419 (1983).
46. If the cross-claim is for indemnity or contribution, ancillary jurisdiction is sufficient.
See FED. R. ay. P. 13(g). When the cross-claim is for the cross-claimant's own loss, some
courts require independent jurisdiction. Compare Farr v. Detroit Trust Co., 116 F.2d 807,
811-12 (6th Cir. 1941) (cross-claim disInissed when realignment of parties destroyed diversity)
with Belcher v. Grooms, 406 F.2d 14, IS (5th Cir. 1968) Gudge declined to realign parties
which would destroy diversity).
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federal court to decide a pendent state law claim without independent
jurisdiction, even after the federal claim is dismissed on the merits.47
And, at least when federal question jurisdiction is exclusive, a federal
court may even allow joinder of a pendent party.48 Thus an attorney
who can get one foot in the federal courthouse door may be able to get
all the way in and may even be allowed to bring along others.
THRUST: The federal court should abstain.
PARRY: The abstention doctrine is really five more or less distinct
categories in which the federal court declines to proceed although
there is jurisdiction.49 The Pullman abstention doctrine allows a fed-
eral court to refrain from deciding a constitutional challenge to state
conduct if there is an unsettled question of state law that may control
and obviate the federal issue. so The Burford abstention doctrine gen-
erally allows the federal court to defer to a state's administration of
state affairs and avoid unnecessary conflict.sl A variant of Burford
abstention, the Younger doctrine, requires that a federal court abstain
from granting declaratory or injunctive relief when a state criminal
47. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (federal court had
power to hear state contract claim after federal action dismissed). Two recent Fifth Circuit
decisions demonstrate the principle of dismissing the remaining state claim when state interests
dominate. Compare Laird v. Board of Trustees, 721 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1983) (rejecting pen-
dent jurisdiction because issue was of statewide importance) with Transource Int'l, Inc. v.
Trinity Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 274, 285 (5th Cir. 1984) (pendent jurisdiction approved on state
antitrust claims). See generally Baker, Federal Jurisdiction, 16 TEx. TECH L. REV. 145, 150
(1985) (state claim should be retained when "common sense" suggests).
48. Compare Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1976) (statute on grants and align-
ment of parties might call for pendent party) with Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1200
(9th Cir. 1977) (Aldinger pendent party jurisdiction not adopted), cert. dism'd, 435 U.S. 982
(1978). See generally Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction--The Problem of "Pendenting Parties", 34
U. Prrr. L. REv. I, 7-18 (1972) (encouraging use of pendent party jurisdiction to promote
judicial economy). Some courts have not limited pendent party jurisdiction to exclusive juris-
diction cases. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 19, at 109 n.39 (4th ed. 1983).
49. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 52, at 303 n.3 (4th ed. 1983) (courts
and commentators differ on existing number of abstention doctrines). For a general discussion
of all types of abstention doctrine, see Wells, The Role ofComity in the Law ofFederal Courts,
60 N.C.L. REv. 59 (1981).
50. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (mandates abstention on
ancillary state issues). See generally Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope ofthe
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 12 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1080 (1974) (discussion of cases in
which application of Pullman doctrine proper).
51. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943) (federal courts decline when
regulations in issue). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 52, at 308 (4th
ed. 1983) (discusses Burford-type abstention).
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proceeding or its equivalent is pending against the federal plaintiff.S2
A fourth category, certification, recognizes the legitimacy of exercis-
ing federal court discretion to certify state law questions to the highest
court of the state under some state statute or state court rule.S3 A
fifth category, of doubtful validity but mentioned for the sake of com-
pleteness, posits federal discretion to stay or dismiss the federal action
simply because a parallel action is pending in state court.S4
It may be unfair to mention these doctrines and then weakly finesse
my "parry" by observing that they are so subtle and full of nuance as
not to be readily captured in this format. So be it. A few observa-
tions, however, are in order.
The last mentioned doctrine, from time to time invoked in wild-cat
fashion by lower courts, ss must be of dubious validity considering re-
cent Supreme Court opinionss6 requiring exceptional circumstances to
52. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (no federal intervention in state crimi-
nal proceedings). See generally Theis, Younger v. Harris: Federalism in Context. 33 HASTINGS
L.J. 103, 106-21 (1981) (concerns of federalism applied to abstention situations).
53. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207. 212 (1960) (state statute permits
federal court to certify state law questions to state supreme court). See generally Brown, Certi-
fication-Federalism in Action. 7 CUM. L. REv. 455 (1977) (discussion of certification by Flor-
ida, Louisiana and Alabama); Roth, Certified Questions from the Federal Courts: Review and
Re-Proposal, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. I (1979) (discussing Florida certification). But see United
Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855, 861 (Tex. 1965) (determination by Texas
court would be advisory when Fifth Circuit retains jurisdiction); see also Note, Refusal ofState
Court to Assume Jurisdiction After Federal Abstention, 20 Sw. L.J. 402, 409 (1966) (criticizing
technicality of calling decision on merits in Delaney an advisory opinion); Note, Courts - Advi-
sory Opinions - State Court Has No Jurisdiction to Render a Declaratory Judgment When a
Federal Court Has Abstained and Retained Jurisdiction Over the Case, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 1394,
1406 (1966) (discussion of Texas prohibition on certification in Delaney). See generally Baker,
Federal Jurisdiction, 16 TEx. TECH L. REv. 145, 179 (1985) (current proposal to overcome
Texas Supreme Court holding concerning state constitutional ban on advisory opinions). On
November 5, 1985, Texas voters adopted a constitutional amendment allowing the Texas
Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas to answer certified questions from
federal appellate courts.
54. See United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 1964) (pro-
ceedings stayed), cert. denied sub nom.. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. First National Bank, 377
U.S. 935 (1965). But see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1451 (1982) (removal from state courts available).
See generally 14A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CooPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE §§ 3721-23, 3725-29 (1985) (removal from state courts preferred practice).
55. Compare Strode Publishers, Inc. v. Holty, 665 F.2d 333, 335 (11th Cir. 1982) (mere
pendency in state court not sufficient on abstention even if subject matter same) with Guilini v.
Blessing, 654 F.2d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 1981) (sound discretion to stay federal proceeding when
identical issue pending in state court).
56. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,19 (1983)
(abuse of discretion in granting stay); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
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stay a federal action.57 Hence, a straightforward challenge to its legit-
imacy by the party hoping for a federal forum is in order. Certifica-
tion, the fourth variation, applies in diversity cases; is a creature of the
relevant state provision; and merely stays the federal proceeding, usu-
ally on appeal. Its effect is to substitute a state court for the federal
court only for the state law question. Everything else remains federal.
The first three doctrines - the Pullman, Burford and Younger hy-
brids - can be costly in terms of delay and lost federal opportunity.58
Their application may sound in abstractions of constitutional law.
The degree of certainty of the state law may control. Interim relief
may possibly be afforded by the federal court while state proceedings
are pursued.59 Later federal proceedings, if likely, and including
Supreme Court review of state court decisions affecting federal rights,
should be within counsel's contemplation during the state court so-
States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-17 (1976) (dismissal not appropriate under any form of abstention
doctrine). But see Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Onte1 Corp., 686 F.2d 531, 535-37 (7th
Cir. 1982) (stay should have been granted). For a comprehensive discussion of staying pro-
ceedings, see generally Note, Staying Diversity Proceedings Pending the Outcome of Parallel
Suits in State Court, 48 Mo. L. REv. 1017 (1983).
57. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 664 (1978) (majority agreed that
Colorado River still is authorative on appropriateness of stay in federal court when pending
state proceeding); see also Comment, Federal Court Stays and Dismissal in Deference to Paral-
lel State Court Proceedings: The Impact ofColorado River, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 641, 652 (1977)
(questions validity of staying proceedings unless unique circumstances present); Note, Absten-
tion and Mandamus After Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 64 CORNELL L. REv. 566 (1979) (im-
pact of Calvert on traditional power to stay examined).
58. See Baggett v. Beillett, 377 U.S. 360,375-79 (1964) (since abstention requires piece-
meal adjudication special circumstances must justify its exercise); England v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,426 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (seven years
without a decision on merits is unnecessary price to pay for federalism). See generally Currie,
The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (part II), 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 268, 317
(1969) (commenting on the high price of abstention to avoid friction, error, and constitutional
questions).
59. See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289, 312 n.18 (1979)
(suggestion that appellees be protected against enforcement of statute pending certification left
to district court); Catrone v. Massachusetts State Racing Comm., 535 F.2d 669, 672 (1st Cir.
1976) (fairness and equity suggest preliminary injunction to protect Catrone's livelihood until
state outcome); Deck House, Inc. v. New Jersey State Board of Architects, 531 F. Supp. 633,
644-48 (N.J. 1982) (injunctive relief should be issued until state decision). But see DeSpain v.
Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1984)(federal court must abstain from granting relief
when state criminal action pending); McDonald v. Burrows, 731 F.2d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1984)
(federal injunction not appropriate against state criminal prosecution). See generally Wells,
Preliminary Injunctions and Abstention: Some Problems in Federalism, 63 CORNELL L. REv.
65 (1977) (proposes more extensive preliminary relief to accommodate interests and further
goals of abstention).
HeinOnline -- 17 St. Mary’s L.J. 252 1985-1986
252 ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:239
journ. These doctrines are indeed very complex, to the point of being
downright metaphysical. That, however, is their vulnerability.
It seems to me, that is the secret of much of federal jurisdiction.
Incantation and ritual can move the court to act or not to act.
Steeped in their lore, a persuasive advocate often can convince the
federal court to go on. My best, last advice is to research and reflect,
never losing sight of the federalism concerns which undergird this
area.
THRUST: The plaintiff has filed suit in state court.
PARRY: Removal may be possible; the trick is to know why, when
and how. Our basic judicial scheme contemplates concurrent state
and federal court jurisdiction. Under the federal statutes, an action
may be transferred from a state court to a federal district court for
trial. The choice to remove is an isomer of the choice of the original
forum, which I assume in this essay prefers the federal court. Re-
moval is a right which, if applicable, prevents a state from confining a
controversy to its courts and obliges the federal court to accept
jurisdiction.60
Curiously, lawyers seem to have more problems with removal than
with other federal jurisdictional issues.61 The device is purely statu-
tory and first attention must rest on the provisions in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441-1451.62 Removal jurisdiction is meant to insure both a com-
petent and impartial forum and an appropriate forum for vindicating
federal rights. 63 Thus, removal parallels, but is not quite identical
with, the diversity and federal question original jurisdictions. Re-
moval jurisdiction is derivative which means that the state court must
60. See Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 704 (1972) (removal gov-
erned by federal law). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 38, at 209-11
(4th ed. 1983) (history of removal statutes detailed).
61. See Bertelsman, Removal Jurisdiction of the United States Courts. 47 Ky. BENCH &
BAR 41 (Oct. 1983) (discussing procedure for removal and attorneys' common difficulties);
Fousekis and Beelsford, Removal, 11 LmGATION, Spring 1985, at 39 (reasons and procedure
for removal); Manginness, Removing a Case to Federal Court, 12 CoLO. LAW. 1639 (Oct.
1983) (tactical jurisdictional and procedural considerations for removal).
The text will discuss only civil cases. Criminal cases are removable by federal officers
charged for acts done in their official duty and by defendants with certain civil rights claims.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 (federal officers) & 1443 (civil rights) (1982).
62. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1451 (1982) (statutes governing removal from state courts to
federal courts). See generally 14A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CooPER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3721-23, 3725·29 (1985) (analyzing and applying removal statutes).
63. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 38, at 209 (4th ed. 1983) (right of
defendant to choose forum unknown at common law and absent from Constitution).
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have had jurisdiction before the federal court may act. Since state
courts are courts of general jurisdiction, state subject matter jurisdic-
tion is not too much of a problem, although state personal jurisdiction
can be more troublesome. A removing defendant may choose to re-
move and then litigate the latter question in the federal forum. 64 If
the state court does have jurisdiction, the matter must also fall within
the federal removal jurisdiction. Unless a specific statute provides
otherwise, a case within the original federal question jurisdiction may
be removed.6s General federal question corrolaries, such as the "aris-
ing under" analysis and the well-pleaded complaint rule, all apply.
There may be some play in the jurisdictional joints, however, for a
removing party to entreat the federal court not to allow the plaintiff to
be so complete a master of his claim as to use "artful pleading" to
prevent removal.66 Removal jurisdiction based on diversity is likewise
coextensive with the original jurisdiction with one important limita-
tion, that a defendant who is a citizen of the forum may not remove
solely on diversity grounds.67
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(a) (1982); Gen. Inv. Co. v. Lakeshore Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261,
269 (1922). Defects in service of process may be cured while removal is pending in federal
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1448 (1980); see also 14A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COoPER,
FEDERAL PRACflCE AND PROCEDURE § 3738 (1985) (procedure after removal). The defend-
ant, however, does not waive any procedural defects by removing the case to federal court. See
George v. Lewis, 228 F. Supp. 725, 727 (D.C. Colo. 1964); Mid-Wisconsin, Inc. v. Sun-X
Intern, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 365, 368 (D.C. Wis. 1964).
65. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), (b) (1982) (actions removable generally). Examples of ex-
press prohibitions against removal include: 15 U.S.C. § 772(a) (1982) (actions under the Se-
curities Act of 1933); 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (1982) (actions arising under state workmen's
compensation laws); 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1982) (certain actions against railroads); & 28
U.S.C. § 1445(b) (suits against common carriers under Interstate Commerce Act unless
amount exceeds $3,(00). See generally 14A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COoPER, FEDERAL
PRACflCE AND PROCEDURE § 3729 (1985) (proceedings under other statutes providing for or
prohibiting removal).
66. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981) (nature of
claim, not plaintiff's characterization, examined). See generally Note, Federated Dep't Stores.
Inc. v. Moitie: Removal and Relitigation Appraised. 1983 WISC. L. REv. 989, 994 (1983) (effect
of parties' litigation strategies on court's disposition of case discussed).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982); see also Kaneshiro v. North Am. Co., 496 F. Supp.
452,455 (Hawaii 1980) (diversity must exist when original action filed as well as when petition
for removal filed).
Removal becomes more problematical in diversity cases involving state fictitious party pro-
visions sometimes called "John Doe practice." See generally Note, John Doe, Where Are You?
The Effects of Fictitious Defendants on Removal Jurisdiction in Diversity Cases. 34 ALA. L.
REv. 99 (1983) (removal defeated by nominal disinterested parties); Note, Doe Defendants and
Other State Relation Back Doctrines in Federal Diversity Cases. 35 STAN. L. REv. 297 (1983)
(proposal for courts to take jurisdiction over fictional defendants).
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The removal statute does provide a small window into federal court
beyond the original jurisdictions. When there are multiple claims or
multiple parties, section 1441(c) allows a defendant to remove the en-
tire case if there is "a separate and independent claim or cause of
action, which would be removable if sued upon alone."68 The district
court may then retain jurisdiction over the whole case or sever and
remand the matters not within its original jurisdiction.69 That win-
dow has been almost closed by a Supreme Court interpretation which
suggests that the kind of relatedness required by the typical state join-
der rules negates the necessary condition of separateness and indepen-
dence for removal to federal court.70 Nevertheless, the subsection
should not be overlooked, for lower courts do not speak with one
voice on many key issues.71
Finally, Title 28 contains a number of special removal provisions,
each with separate annotations, in addition to the general statute, for
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982); see also Suffolk Co. v. Long Island Lighting Co., 549 F.
Supp. 1250, 1263 (E.D. N.Y. 1982) (when one cause of action removable entire case
removable).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be remova-
ble if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or
causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all
issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its origi-
nal jurisdiction.
/d.; see also H. R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (purpose of change was simplifi-
cation). But see Harper v. Sonnabend, 182 F. Supp. 594, 595 (D.C. N.Y. 1960) (statute causes
confusion and uncertainty).
70. See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 11 (1951) (separable controversy
no longer adequate for removal unless an independent cause of action). See generally Cohen,
Problems in Removal ofa "Separate and Independent Claim or Cause ofAction ': 46 MINN. L.
REv. I, 13 (1961) (discussing restrictive ruling ofFinn). But see Climax Chemical Co. v. C. F.
Braun & Co., 370 F.2d 616, 618-19 (10th Cir. 1967) (claims based on single construction of
plant but numerous breaches of warranties by three defendants may be removed under section
1441(c»; see also Hermann v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (D.C. N.Y. 1969)
(removal allowed under section 1441(c) despite Finn).
71. Application of section 1441(c) to third party claims is an example of an issue dividing
the lower courts. Compare Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Aaron-Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 563 F.
Supp. 1108, 1111-12 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (under section 1441(c) third party claim removable when
basis of liability and recovery separate) with Carr v. Mid-South Oxygen, Inc., 543 F. Supp.
299, 301 (N.D. Miss. 1982) (wife's loss of consortium claim is not separate from husband's
personal injury claim and not removable). See generally 14A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
CooPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3724 (1985) (independent causes of action
under section 1441(c) analyzed); Note, Third Party Removal Under Section 1441(c), 52 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 133, 143 (1983) (claims by third parties are not separate and independent to
justify removal).
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example: section l44l(d) (removal of civil action against foreign
state); section 1442 (suit or prosecution against federal officers); sec-
tion 1442a (suit or prosecution against member of armed forces); sec-
tion 2241(c)(2) (habeas corpus relief from state custody); section
2679(d) (injury caused by federal employee within scope of employ-
ment); section 1443 (civil rights actions). Of these the last mentioned
is the most expansive.72 And there are other provisions in the Code
recognizing a particularized right to remove, for example: 12 U.S.C.
§ 632 (Federal Reserve Bank); 12 U.S.C. § 1452(e) (Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation); 22 U.S.C. § 282f (International Fi-
nance Corporation); 22 U.S.C. § 286a (International Monetary Fund
and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). These
and other special provisions should not be overlooked.
III. DIVERSITy73
THRUST: There is no diversity jurisdiction over domestic relations
cases.74
72. See White v. Wellington, 627 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1980) (conflict between official's
state obligation and federal law sufficient for removal under section 1443). See generally Note,
An Expansive Interpretation ofthe Civil Rights Removal Statute - One Step Too Far. 47 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 739 (1981) (discusses sweeping impact of White in permitting removal when
constitutional rights would be denied in state court action).
73. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2 provides in part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity...-between Citizens of
different States. . . .
U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2.
A person establishes state citizenship for diversity purposes by being domiciled in a state.
See Sun Printing & Pub. Assn. v. Edwards, 194 U.S. 377, 387 (1904) (residence in state insuffi-
cient for diversity jurisdiction); Chicago & N.W. R. Co. v. Oble, 117 U.S. 123, 128-29 (1886)
(domicile rather than residence controls in determining diversity); see also C. WRIGHT, LAW
OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 26, at 146 (4th ed. 1983) (diversity depends on citizenship and domi-
cile). The need for and propriety of diversity jurisdiction has been widely debated, compare
Sheran & Isaacman, State Cases Belong In State Courts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1, 15 (1978)
(advocating abolishing diversity jurisdiction) with Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction.
16 Harv. J. Legis. 403, 407 (1979) (diversity jurisdiction play important role in federal system
of adjudicating rights). While I personally advocate abolishing diversity jurisdiction, in this
section I discuss methods of using rules on diversity to the practitioner's benefit. See Baker,
Federal Jurisdiction, 16 TEX. TECH L. REv. 145, 164 (1985).
74. See. e.g.• Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 512-
14 (2d Cir. 1973) (strong interest of state in domestic relations justifies jurisdiction);
Magazenar v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 787 (3rd Cir. 1972) (since domestic relations pecu-
liarly suited to state control, exception to federal jurisdiction justified); Buercho1d v. Ortiz, 401
F.2d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1968) (experience and interest justifies state court jurisdiction to decide
paternity and child support).
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PARRY: For more than a hundred years, that has been the an-
nounced rule.7s Traditionally, diversity plaintiffs have been denied a
federal forum in,domestic relations suits for divorce, property settle-
ments, alimony, and child custody. Nothing in the Constitution re-
quires this approach.76 Instead, this has been a judge-made exception
to the jurisdictional statute which recently has shown signs of
narrowing.77
Results in recent cases have been inconsistent and unpredictable, in
part, because the courts do not seem willing or able to define the
boundaries of the exception. An opportunistic proceduralist should
view this confusion as an opening into federal court. Recent decisions
by some federal courts have held that causes of action sounding in
tort or contract between family members fall outside the exception if
resolution of the issues does not depend on familial relation and the
suit is not a transparent effort at avoiding the rule.78 Just when a
claim is within or without the exception is not easily determined. One
75. The point may be traced to dictum in Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584
(1858). See generally Atwood, Domestic Relations Cases in Federal Court: Toward a Princi-
pled Exercise of Jurisdiction, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 571 (1984) (proposal to abandon domestic
relations exception in favor of applying statutory jurisdictional prerequisites); Comment, Fed-
eral Jurisdiction and the Domestic Relations Exception,' A Search For Parameters, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 843 (1984) (proposal to examine nature of intrafamilial rights before abstention). Ab-
stention may be the appropriate response. See Note, Application of the Federal Abstention
Doctrines to the Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 1983 DUKE L.J.
1095 (1983) (arguing for the application of Burford and Younger abstention doctrines to do-
mestic relations).
76. See De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 308 (1906) (appeal from divorce
granted by territorial court heard); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168 (1899) (Court assumed
appellate jurisdiction over divorce decree of territorial court). See generally 13B C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. CoOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3609 n.5 (1984) (federal
court may have jurisdiction to determine validity of foreign divorce decree).
77. See 23B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3609 n.5 (1984).
78. See, e.g., Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834 (4th Cir. 1982) (federal juris-
diction exists when child removed by estranged husband since tort not dependent on family
relationship); Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1978) (federal jurisdiction to
collect unpaid alimony); Anastasi v. Anastasi, 532 F. Supp. 720, 724 (D.N.J. 1982) (palimony
contract not within domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction). See generally Note,
The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 1824 (1983)
(advocating application of federalism doctrines and federal jurisdiction principles to domestic
relations); Note, Federal Courts - The Continued Vitality & Questionable Validity of the D0-
mestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction, 56 TEMPLE L.Q. 228 (1983) (criticism of
Bennett holding that best interests of child beyond federal court competence); Note, Enforcing
State Domestic Relations Decrees in Federal Court, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1357 (1983) (federal
courts should enforce state alimony and support decrees that are not modifiable).
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recent decision illustrates the wavering nature of the line. A man's
tort action to recover money damages from his ex-wife for the alleged
kidnapping of their child was within the diversity jurisdiction while
his request for injunctive relief to enforce a child custody decree was
not within the exception and barred.79
THRUST: Federal courts may not hear probate matters.80
PARRY: The analysis follows the last thrust-parry. Nothing in the
Constitution or in the statute necessarily requires this second judge-
made rule. There seems to be even more room for exception here. A
leading commentator has observed that the rule "is far from absolute"
and depends on "unclear distinctions of the utmost subtlety."81
Again, some recent decisions seem to be narrowing the bar.
There is agreement that "pure" probate matters are outside federal
diversity jurisdiction. A federal court may not take control of prop-
erty in a state court's custody, may not invoke a general jurisdiction
over the probate, and may not otherwise interfere with the state
court's probate proceeding.82 Once the suit may be characterized as
not involving "pure" probate, the issue becomes whether the federal
action will interfere unduly with the state probate proceedings. The
courts have developed two ways to evaluate "interference." One ap-
proach focuses on the nature of the claim. If plaintiff would have the
federal court rule on the validity of the will, there is interference and
the claim is barred.83 If plaintiff admits the validity of the will and
merely asserts a claim to share in the distribution there is no interfer-
ence and the federal claim may be heard.84 A second, more common
approach examines the procedures which would have been followed
79. Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042-44 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Wasserman v.
Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834-35 (4th Cir. 1982) (tort of child enticement within federal
jurisdiction). See generally Note, Enforcing State Domestic Relations Decrees in Federal Court.
50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1357 (1983) (final decrees from state enforced).
80. See Byers v. McAuley, 149 U.S. 608, 617 (1983) (no federal jurisdiction to distribute
property in state court custody); Turton v. Turton, 644 F.2d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 1981) (federal
court may not oversee estate administration or require premature accounting).
81. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 25, at 145 (4th ed. 1983). Compare
Turton v. Turton, 644 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1981) (no federal jurisdiction to transfer prop-
erty still under probate) with Akin v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank, 322 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1963)
(federal court exercises jurisdiction over suit against executor).
82. See Armstrong, Practice and Procedure. 34 MERCER L. REv. 1363, 1364-65 (1983)
(limited probate jurisdiction of federal courts discussed and approved).
83. See Mitchell v. Nixon, 200 F.2d 50, 51-52 (5th Cir. 1952) (will contest not within
probate exception to allow federal jurisdiction).
84. Compare Lee v. Hunt, 431 F. Supp. 371, 377-78 (W.D. La. 1977) (claim against exec-
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had the federal claim been brought in state court. If the claim would
be cognizable only in the state probate court, interference is estab-
lished and the federal court will refuse to exercise jurisdiction.85 If
the claim could have been enforced in a state court of general jurisdic-
tion, the federal court will entertain the suit.86 Either approach or
some combination allows for significant federal jurisdiction despite
the general rule.87 That is my point.
THRUST: A state is not a citizen for purposes of diversity and may
not be sued under that jurisdiction.88
PARRY: That is the well-established rule. Also as well-estab-
lished, however, is that a political subdivision of a state is a citizen of
that state for diversity purposes unless it is the state's alter ego, (ie.,
the state is the real party in interest as determined by state law).89 A
diversity suit may proceed against a state agency which is established
to be independent, separate, and distinct from the state. If appropri-
ate, naming the state agency may be the ticket into federal court.90
THRUST: A party "by assignment or otherwise, has been improp-
erly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction...."91
utor not within probate exception) with Akin v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank, 322 F.2d 749, 753-54
(5th Cir. 1963) (adopted child's claim against executor within federal jurisdiction).
85. See Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199,205 (1918) (no federal jurisdiction when county
court exercises original probate jurisdiction); Ledbetter v. Taylor, 359 F.2d 760, 761 (10th Cir.
1966) (no federal jurisdiction when exclusive jurisdiction in county probate court).
86. See Burgess v. Murray, 194 F.2d 131, 133 (5th Cir. 1952) (federal court hasjurisdic-
tion to remove trustee).
87. See Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 1979) (either, both approaches
or a new approach may be used to determine jurisdiction in probate-like action). See generally
Note, The "Probate Exception" to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: Matters Related to Probate.
48 Mo. L. REv. 564 (1983) (probate and estate administration while matters of state interest
may fall within federal court jurisdiction).
88. See Moor v. County of Alemeda, 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973); Minnesota v. Northern
Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48, 63 (1904); Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482,
487 (1894).
89. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973). This rule is separate and
distinct from any issue of eleventh amendment inlmunity although the analysis of the two
issues is "virtually identical." See Tradigrain, Inc. v. Mississippi State Port Auth., 701 F.2d
1131, 1132 (5th Cir. 1983).
90. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 126 (1908) (suit against attorney general was not a
suit against Minnesota barred by the eleventh amendment). But see Penhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, _ U.S. __ 104 S. Ct. 900, 917-19, 79 L. Ed.2d 67, 91 (1984)
(state law claims against state officials brought in federal court barred by eleventh
amendment).
91. 28 U.S.C. 1359 (1982). The typical case within this statute involves the making or
joining of parties to satisfy the diversity requirement. The statute, however, would apply for
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PARRY: In those words, 28 U.S.C. § 1359 prohibits the manufac-
ture of diversity. When the transfer is absolute and the assignor re-
tains no interest, the citizenship of the assignee controls and there is
no impropriety or collusion.92 A nondiverse assignor might sell a liq-
uidated claim to a diverse assignee, but that strategy is limited to ne-
gotiable claims.93 A party can change his own domicile to another
state and gain jurisdiction even if the move is motivated solely by a
desire to create jurisdiction.94 Most claims, however, are not so mar-
ketable and do not justify moving to another state. Short of those
strategies, section 1359 must be overcome. Arguably, section 1359 is
as effective in creating jurisdiction as it is in defeating it.9s The collu-
sion issue commonly arises in actions initiated by nonresident fiducia-
ries such as administrators or guardians. Two approaches have
emerged.96 Some courts apply a "motive/function" test to the ap-
pointment and consider: (1) the relationship between the representa-
other jurisdictional bases such as the minimum jurisdictional amount or the federal question
requirement. For example, the appointment of a receiver in bankruptcy can be ripe with sec-
tion 1359 problems. See Gross v. Houghland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1038 (6th Cir. 1983) (receiver
properly appointed may rely on his citizenship to create diversity). For a general discussion of
the problems addressed by section 1359, see Cohan & Tate, Manufacturing Federal Jurisdic-
tion by the Appointment of Representatives: Its Legality and Propriety. I VILL. L. REV. 201
(1956).
92. See R. C. Hedreen Co. v. Crow Tribal Hous. Auth., 521 F. Supp. 599, 607 (D.C.
Mont. 1981) (assignor relinquished all interest in construction contracts); Slaughter v. Mallet
Land & Cattle Co., 141 F. 282, 287 (5th Cir.) (conveyance bona fide with no reconveyance
contemplated), cert. denied, 201 U.S. 646 (1905).
93. See Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823, 828 n.9 (1969) (motive irrelevant
when transfer of interest in lawsuit is absolute).
94. See Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624-25 (1914) (motive in changing domicile
irrelevant). But see Dossett v. Davis, 29 F. Supp. 483, 483 (B.D. Tenn. 1939) (verdict set aside
when plaintiff moved to Kentucky to create diversity without requisite intent to become Ken-
tucky resident).
95. See. e.g.• Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 190 (1931) (Louisiana
administrator appointed to defeat diversity upheld); McSparevan v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 875,
cert. denied. 395 U.S. 903 (1968) (manufactured diversity inadequate to invoke federaljurisdic-
tion); Herrick V. Pioneer Gas Products Co., 429 F. Supp. 80, 84 (W.D. Oklo 1977) (section
1359 relates to improper creation of federal diversity not destruction). But see Miller V. Perry,
456 F.2d 63,65 (4th Cir. 1972) (statute requiring appointment of in-state administrator should
not prevent federal removal). See generally, C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 31, at
171-72 (4th ed. 1983) (discussion on choosing personal representatives to defeat diversity).
96. Compare Bass v. Texas Power & Light Co., 432 F.2d 763,766 (5th Cir. 1970) ("mo-
tive function" test adopted), cert. denied. 401 U.S. 975 (1971) with Bishop V. Hendricks, 495
F.2d 289, 294-95 (4th Cir.) ("substantial stake" test used), cert. denied. 419 U.S. 1056 (1974).
See generally Baker, Federal Jurisdiction, 16 TEx. TECH L. REv. 145, 165-67 (1985) (discuss-
ing Fifth Circuit "totality of circumstances" approach in Bianca).
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tive and the represented person; (2) the representative's powers and
responsibilities; (3) whether the diverse representative is a logical
choice; and (4) the nature of the suit.97 Other courts apply a "sub-
stantial stake" test which deemphasizes motive and considers how
much of an interest the representative has in the outcome of the suit.98
In courts following this second approach, the advocate might be able
to structure the assignment in such a way as to strengthen an antici-
pated claim of diversity. In any event, the creative lawyer seeking
entry to federal court should identify the applicable test and argue
accordingly.
THRUST: The jurisdictional amount requirement is not satisfied.
PARRY: As long as we have had diversity jurisdiction, we have
had the requirement that a certain minimum amount be in contro-
versy before suit can be brought in federal court.99 Since 1958, when
the figure was last increased, the amount in controversy, exclusive of
interest and costs,l00 has been established at "in excess of $10,000."101
The most obvious "parry" is simply to allege that the requisite
amount is in controversy, which seems easy enough. Back in 1958,
$10,000 was a more significant amount than it is today. Then that
was how much a house cost, today you can find an economy automo-
97. See, e.g., Bianca v. Parke-Davis Pharmaceutical Div., 723 F.2d 392, 398-99 (5th Cir.
1984) (adopting "totality of circumstances" approach for ultimate inquiry into motive and
purpose of appointment); Hackney-v. Newman Memorial Hosp., Inc., 621 F.2d 1069, 1070
(10th Cir.) (changing representative to create diversity effective when new representative also
beneficiary), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980); Joyce v. Seyel, 429 F.2d 128, 130 (3rd Cir.
1970) (appointing nonresident administrator experienced in financial affairs and removed from
family's personal problems not artificial diversity).
98. See Vaughan v. Southern Ry. Co., 542 F.2d 641,644 (4th Cir. 1976) (no jurisdiction
when ancillary administrator has no stake in outcome); Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289,
295 (4th Cir.) (out-of-state administrator must have more than nominal relationship to sustain
jurisdiction), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974). But see Sadler v. New Hanover Memorial
Hosp., Inc., 588 F.2d 914,917 (4th Cir. 1978) (executrix named by will controlling for section
1359 purposes). One circuit has adopted a "nominal interest" test in evaluating section 1359
issues. See Betar v. De Haviland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., 603 F.2d 30, 34 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1098 (1980).
99. See Baker, The History and Tradition of the Amount in Controversy Requirement: A
Proposa/ to "Up the Ante" in Diversity Jurisdiction, 102 F.D.R. 299, 307 (1984).
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)(1976); see a/so Clark v. National Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (1975) (attorney's fees, penalty, fees cost and interest not included in
$10,000 mininum). See generally 14A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3712 (1985) (discussion of the "interest and costs"
computation).
101. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332 (1958) ($10,000 excluding costs and interest). The re-
quirement is presently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(I)(1976).
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bile for that price. 102 In most cases, alleging satisfaction will be
"parry" enough. The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he sum
claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in
good faith. It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really
for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal."103 A sec-
ond "parry" is available when the value of the benefit to the plaintiff is
different from the value of the loss to the defendant, as frequently is
true when the suit is for an injunction.104 Choosing the viewpoint
with the higher value may save jurisdiction. While some courts
woodenly value the controversy from the plaintiff's viewpoint alone
and other courts woodenly use the defendant's viewpoint alone, a re-
cent trend suggests a more flexible approach to look at both to deter-
mine if either viewpoint satisfies the requirement. lOS A third possible
"parry" -aggregation- can be little more than mentioned in the
brief compass of this essay. A leading commentator has concluded,
"[t]he law on aggregation of claims to satisfy the requirement of
amount in controversy is in a very unsatisfactory state...[t]hus it is
not altogether easy to say what the law is in this area, and it is quite
hard to say why it is as it seems to be."I06 For now, it is enough to
say that aggregating separate claims by a single plaintiff against a sin-
gle defendant may allow the suit to continue,107 but the rules change
102. See Baker, The History and Tradition ofthe Amount in Controversy Requirement: A
Proposal to "Up the Ante" in Diversity Jurisdiction, 102 F.D.R. 299, 324-25 (1984) (comparing
consumer price indices).
103. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938).
104. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516-18 (1939) (value of free speech in ques-
tion); Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 110 (1847) (custody of child value-determina-
tion); Lister v. Commissioner Court, 566 F.2d 490, 492-93 (5th Cir. 1978) (dilution of vote by
reapportionment value addressed).
105. Compore Alphonso v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 308 F.2d 724,727 (5th
Cir. 1962) (controversy valued only from plaintiff's viewpoint) and Family Motor Inn, Inc. v.
L-K Enterprises Div. Consol. Foods Corp., 369 F. Supp. 766, 769 (B.D. Ky. 1973) (value
assessed only from defendant's viewpoint) with Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n v. Walmart
Stores, Inc., 605 F.2d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 1979) (value determined from either plaintiff's or
defendant's viewpoint). See generally Kennedy, Valuing Federal Matters in Controversy:
Hohfeldian Analysis in Symbolic Logic, 35 TENN. L. REv. 423, 429-34 (1968) (either viewpoint
rule is better rule); Note, The Jurisdictional Amount Requirement--Valuation from the Defend-
ant's Perspective, 11 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 637, 652 (1978) (either viewpoint rule effectuates pur-
pose of jurisdictional amount requirement-consideration of non-trivial cases by federal
court).
106. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 36, at 196 (4th ed. 1983).
107. See FED. R. CIv. P. 18; see also Lynch v. Porter, 446 F.2d 225, 228 (8th Cir.) (once
diversity invoked single plaintiff may aggregate claims), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1971);
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when there are either multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants. 108
The point, again, is that the complexities of the jurisdictional rules
create windows into federal court.
IV. FEDERAL QUESTIONS
THRUST: The Declaratory Judgment Actl09 is not a grant ofjuris-
diction to the federal courts. I 10
PARRY: I have no quarrel with that truism, but I might suggest
that invoking the court's discretion under the Act can be an impor-
tant part of an overall effective jurisdiction strategy. Generally, the
declaratory judgment statute allows earlier access to federal court
when neither party may yet be able to sue for a coercive remedy, so
long as there exists a genuine case or controversy.lIl The difficulty-to-
be-turned-to-advantage involves the rigid requirement that the federal
question appear on the face of the complaint well-pleaded, a require-
Griffin v. Red Run Lodge, Inc., 610 F.2d 1198, 1204 (4th Cir. 1979) (when one claim satisfies
amount requirement jurisdiction exists for all claims); Davis H. Elliott Co. v. Caribbean Utili-
ties Co., 513 F.2d 1176, 1183 (6th Cir. 1975) (one plaintiff can aggregate causes of action
against one defendant). See generally 14A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3704 (1985) (aggregating claims of single plaintiff proper rule);
Note, The Federal Jurisdictional Amount and Rule 20 Joinder of Parties: Aggregation of
Claims, 53 MINN. L. REv. 94, 99-105 (1968) (aggregation permissible only by one plaintiff
with several claims against one defendant).
108. See Walter v. Northeastern R. Co., 147 U.S. 370, 374 (1893) (each separate plaintiff
with separate claim(s) must satisfy jurisdictional amount); Wheless v. City of St. Louis, 96 F.
865 (B.D. Mo.) (distinct claims cannot be aggregated to satisfy jurisdictional amount), affd,
180 U.S. 379 (1899). See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, 14A FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3704 (1985) (aggregation of claims
analyzed).
109. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1982).
110. See Public Servo Comm. of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248-49 (1952) (proce-
dural purpose of Declaratory Judgment Act would be distorted if suit could be based on antici-
pated defense); Skelley Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1950)
(Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural device not tool for creating jurisdiction). See gener-
ally Trautman, Federal Right Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Remedy, 7 VAND. L. REv. 445,
451-63 (1954) (discussing cases that could never be brought absent declaratory relief).
111. See Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969) (test is whether there is substantial
controversy, adverse legal interests, sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant declaratory
judgment); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 232 (1937) (declaratory judgment
statute constitutional because case and controversy requirement satisfied). Declaratory judg-
ments as a type of cause of action emerged from a demand for quick judicial resolution of
disputes. See Zamir, The Declaratory Judgment Revisted, 30 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 43,
45 (1977); see also Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment--A Needed Procedural Reform, 28
YALE L.J. I, 105-30 (1918).
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ment which dates from the forms of action era. 112 The situation in
which plaintiff sues on an affirmative federal right obviously satisfies
the well-pleaded complaint rule, as when an alleged owner of a patent
seeks a declaration of validity and infringement rather than suing the
defendant for damages. 113 Suppose, however, that the request is for a
declaration that the opposing party does not have a federal right.
Before the creation of the declaratory remedy, such a complaint only
would have anticipated a federal question defense and would not have
satisfied the well-pleaded complaint rule}l4 Today, the defendant in
the patent example above can seek a declaration that he has not in-
fringed or that the alleged owner does not hold a valid patent. 115
Such use of the Act does allow some plaintiffs into federal courts who
could not gain access otherwise.
One additional creative use of the declaratory judgment involves a
plaintiff seeking a declaration that federal law immunizes him from a
nonfederal claim by a defendant. 116 Suppose one party to a contract
asks for a declaration that an after-enacted federal statute excuses his
further performance and preempts the other party's suit for breach.
As one begins to expect in matters of federal jurisdiction, there are
two approaches. The narrow approach would require dismissal, since
in the coercive action suing for breach the federal question would
arise only as a defense to the contract suit brought by the nonbreach-
ing party.117 The broader and seemingly viable view would allow the
112. See Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908) (complaint which
raised federal question as anticipated defense must be dismissed). But see Zaconick v. City of
Hollywood, 85 F. Supp. 52, 55 (S.D. Fla. 1949) (federal claim in defendant's complaint confers
jurisdiction). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 100, at 671-72 (4th ed.
1983) (discussing well-pleaded complaint rule and its limitations). Only tax matters are ex-
cluded under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (federal) and under 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (state). See id. at 672-73.
113. See Talbot v. Quakerstate Oil Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 967, 968 (3d Cir. 1939). See gener-
ally Note, Patent Licensee Standing and the Declaratory Judgment Act. 83 CoLUM. L. REv.
186, 199 (1983) (proposes heightened standing barrier to prevent harrassment of patentees).
114. Compare American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 259-60
(1916) (no well-pleaded federal question before the Act) with Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d
585, 594 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (federal question well-pleaded after the Act).
115. See Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 595-96 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (declaratory
judgment of collective bargaining agreement); E. Edlemann & Co. v. Triple A Specialty Co.,
88 F.2d 852, 853-54 (7th Cir.) (declaratory judgment on infringement permissible), cen. de-
nied, 300 U.S. 680 (1937).
116. See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, UMW, 325 U.S. 161, 162-63 (1945)
(employer sought declaratory judgment that under Fair Labor Standards Act he was not liable
to employees).
117. See Skelley Oil v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1950) (artful plead-
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artful pleading,11s Recent decisions1l9 suggest that a party, claiming
that federal law controls the issue and preempts otherwise applicable
state law, can institute a federal declaratory judgment action even
though a coercive suit by the party who is relying on the state law
could not be brought in or removed to federal COurt. 120 Strategy thus
almost overtakes jurisdictional principles as the party claiming a fed-
eral preemption will seek to avoid an unsympathetic state forum by
bringing a declaratory judgment action in federal court. 121
ing anticipating defense distorts purpose of Declaratory Judgment Act). See generally Com-
ment, Federal Question Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts and the Declaratory Judgment Act,
1966 Ky. L.J. 150, 159-63 (defense based on federal law not sufficient to confer jurisdiction).
118. See Zanconick v. City of Hollywood, 85 F. Supp. 52, 54-55 (S.D. Fla. 1949) (auc-
tioneer challenging ordinance regulating his business hours based complaint on equal protec-
tion); see also Note, Federal Jurisdiction, 3 VAND. L. REv. 320 (1950) (broad view of artful
pleading to invoke declaratory relief). See generally lOA C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, FEDERAL
P1lAcnCE AND PROCEDURE § 2767 n.65 (1983) (additional cases applying broad view); C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 18, at 101-02 (4th ed. 1983) (discussing simple appli-
cation of broad view).
119. See Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1259-60 (9th
Cir. 1979) (Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulatory scheme preempted California Housing
Act); First Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417, 422 (1st Dir. 1979) (Federal Home
Loan Bank Board regulations in conflict with Massachusetts statute); Braniff Int'l, Inc. v.
Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 576 F.2d 1100, 1105 (5th Cir. 1978) (federal jurisdiction to enter-
tain constitutional challenge to Florida statute regulating interstate air carriers); Rath Packing
Co. v. Becher, 530 F.2d 1295, 1304 (9th Cir. 1975) (federal meat packaging regulation pre-
empted state statutes), affd sub nom. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977). See
generally Note, The Expanded Federal Question: On the "Independent Viability" ofDeclara-
tory Claims, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 809 (1982) (discussing expansion ofdeclaratory judgment
use).
120. Compare Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 n.14 (1983) (federal juris-
diction exists when ERISA regulation preempts state human rights law) with Franchise Tax
Bd. of the State of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California,
463 U.S. 1, 11 (1983) (state tax levy against union welfare benefit trust not preempted by
ERISA federal regulation or removable to federal court). See generally lOA C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & K. KANE, FEDERAL P1lAcnCE AND PROCEDURE § 2767 (1983) (federal question
issues in declaratory judgments analyzed).
121. See Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Preemption Claims: A Post-Franchise Tax Board
Analysis, 62 TExAs L. REv. 893 (1984) (discussion of federal question jurisdiction over declar-
atory judgments which raise preemption as sole federal issue). Another strategical use of a
declaratory judgment seeks to have a party declared not liable or liable for future acts. While
commentators have suggested that jurisdiction should not exist because the controversy is a
mere contingency, courts have generally found a sufficient dispute to create jurisdiction. Com-
pare HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 132 (Baton,
Mishkin, Shapiro & Wechsler ed. 1973) (legal consequences of future conduct too speculative
to justify jurisdiction) with Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 461 (1974) (possibility of future
criminal liability sufficient threat to create jurisdiction) and Int'l Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co.,
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THRUST: Federal law creates a duty without expressly providing
a remedy and, consequently, there is no federal question.
PARRY: If a remedy may be implied, there is federal question ju-
risdiction. 122 Such a remedy may be implied directly under the Con-
stitution123 or under some relevant statute. 124 The important
jurisdictional point is that the implication of a remedy simultaneously
and necessarily creates federal question jurisdiction over the newly-
created private cause of action. While the constitutional category is
somewhat limited by that document's text, in our highly regulated
economic system there are many statutes from which to choose. 125
Four factors generally justify the implication of a statutory remedy:
(1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the class sought to be pro-
tected by the statute; (2) whether there is any indication of legislative
intent to create or deny a private remedy; (3) whether a private rem-
edy would further the legislative purpose; and (4) whether the cause
of action is one traditionally reserved to state law so that a federal
implication would be inconsistent. 126 The key factor, however, is di-
vining a congressional intent to establish a private right of action in
the entrails of legislative history, and more recent Supreme Court de-
cisions suggest a hardening of attitude against that implication. 127
623 F.2d 1207, 1215-17 (7th Cir. 1980) (future business transactions immediate controversy
for jurisdictional purposes).
122. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980) (remedy against federal officials im-
plied from violation of deceased inmate's eighth amendment rights); Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979) (private cause of action under Title IX education amend-
ments for sex discrimination in medical school admission); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (remedy implied from violation of constitutional rights under
fourth amendment).
123. See, e.g., David v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1979) (cause of action implied
under fifth amendment); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971)
(implied remedy for fourth amendment right violation); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)
(violation of fourth and fifth amendment rights requires court to adjust remedy necessary to
grant relief).
124. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 382
(1982) (right of action under Commodity Exchange Act); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. II, 19 (1979) (private action under Investment Advisers Act); Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388 (1970) (cause of action under Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
125. The courts seem to see themselves to be freer to imply remedies under the Constitu-
tion than under a statute. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239-43 (1979).
126. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
127. See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 301 (1981) (no private cause of
action implied for violation of Rivers and Harbor Act); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82-84 (1975)
(no private right of action implied tor shareholder when corporation violated political contrl-
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The plaintiff should hope for a precedent from the earlier period of
willingness-to-implicate, since these days new implications seem so
difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, the implication of a private cause of
action is still possible, and some federal judges may be more willing to
imply a remedy and create the corresponding jurisdiction on a com-
pelling record. 128
THRUST: There is no federal question arising under either the
Constitution or any federal statute.
PARRY: The statutory term "laws" for the general "arising
under" jurisdiction includes federal common law. 129 That federal
common law exists we may accept as an article of faith; just what it is
and when it applies are questions not readily answered by any simi-
larly bold assertion. 130 There are three hallmarks of federal common
law any of which might justify its invocation. 131 First, some situa-
tions require a federal common law to protect an uniquely federal
interest when state law would be in confiict. 132 Second, some situa-
tions are so dominated by federal statutes that federal common law
seems a necessary concommitant. 133 Third, there are some situations
bution prohibition of 18 U.S.C. § 610); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 (1963) (no
private cause of action for dress of subpoena power by federal officer); see also 19 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 4514
(1978) (reluctance to infer remedies not provided by Congress); Hill & Baker, Dam Federal
Jurisdiction!, 32 EMORY L.J. 3, 40 (1983); Luneberg, Justice Rehnquist, Statutory Interpreta-
tion. the Policies of Clear Statement, and Federal Jurisdiction, 58 IND. L.J. 211, 253 (1982);
Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1193, 1289 (1982).
128. Cf. Note, Closing the Courthouse Door on Section 503 Complaints: Davis v. United
Airlines, Inc., 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1159, 1164 n.20 (1983). Alternatively, a court might be
persuaded to recognize a cause of action under section 1983 and jurisdiction therefore under
28 U.S.C. § 1343. See Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement ofFederal Law, 49
U. CHI. L. REv. 394, 415 (1982).
129. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.s. 91, 99-100 (1972).
130. No less a jurist than Justice Brandeis made the point in two opinions on the same
decision day. Compare Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("There is no
federal general common law.") with Hinderlinder v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) ("[It] is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the
statutes nor the decisions of either State may be conclusive.")
131. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION § 4514 (1982) (federal common law outlined and analyzed).
132. See Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 654 (1979) (change of course of
stream on Indian land governed by federal law). But see Burks v. Lasher, 441 U.S. 471, 477
(1979) (termination of stockholders suit by directors under federal acts governed by state law);
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 715 (1979) (priority of liens under federal
loan program governed by state law).
133. See Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 534 (1983)
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in which the federal and national concern is inherently superior and
federal law must control. 134
Federal common law thus may be invoked if there are significant
federal interests at stake which would be impaired if state law is used
and if there would be no significant displacement of state law. 13s
When federal common law does apply of course, federal jurisdiction
follows. 136
THRUST: There is no general federal question jurisdiction.
PARRY: Assuming that is so, the attorney should look over the
menu of special federal question jurisdiction statutes. Between 1875
and 1980, the general federal question statute carried a jurisdictional
amount requirement. 137 Consequently, Congress enacted a plethora
of special statutes without an amount requirement which are spread
throughout Chapter 85 of Title 28 and beyond. Given the equation of
(Interstate Commerce Act regulation of tariffs predicates all actions for payment arising under
federal law); Louisville & Nashvillb R. v. Rice, 247 U.S. 201, 202 (1918) (duty and obligation
to pay tariff depends on Interstate Commerce Act to the exclusion of all other rules).
134. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)
(federal common law exists for rights of United States, interstate, international, and admiralty
disputes); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 201 (1940) (purpose of National Bank Act to
protect creditors against insolvency of bank national concern); Dyke v. Dyke, 227 F.2d 461,
464 (6th Cir. 1955) (federal law must govern rights and duties of United States on insurance
policies issued to servicemen).
135. See, e.g., Hinderlinder v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (state statutes not
conclusive as to interstate water apportionment); City of Evansville v. Ky. Liquid Recycling,
Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1018 (7th Cir. 1979) (interstate effects of water pollution states federal
common law nuisance claim); In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp.
737, 749 (B.D. N.Y. 1979) (war contractor's liability to soldiers for effects of toxic chemicals
not yet developed in state law), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987, 993 (2d Cir. 1980) (no federal interest in
servicemen's claim against private manufacturer), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 980 (1981). See
generally, Note, In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation: Limiting the Use ofFederal
Common Law as the Basis for Federal Question Jurisdiction in Private Litigation, 48 BROOK-
LYN L. REv. 1027, 1042 (1982) (restricting federal common law in private suits).
The concept is not unlike the doctrine of protective jurisdiction which surfaces from time to
time. Protective jurisdiction is invoked in federal court cases between nondiverse parties
which are governed by nonfederal rules of decision. The case is said to "arise under" the
jurisdictional statute. See Verlinden B. V. V. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983).
See generally, Note, The Theory ofProtective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 933, 948 (1982)
(protective jurisdiction justified by belief that state determination of state law inadequate).
136. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972) (claims based on fed-
eral common law are within federal jurisdiction). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FED-
ERAL CoURTS § 17, at 97 (4th ed. 1983) (when federal common law exists there is federal
jurisdiction).
137. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 17, at 91 (4th ed. 1983) ($10,000
jurisdictional amount until 1980).
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the "arising under" test usually used in these special statutes with that
test in the general statute, the elimination of the general amount re-
quirement may render these special provisions surplusage. 138 I am
not so sure. First, the special statutes have been viewed as primary
exercises of congressional power to create docket priorities, while the
general statute is more c()rrectly viewed as residual, a delegation to
the courts to deal with those matters Congress neglected. 139 Second,
some special federal question statutes impose an amount requirement
which still applies after the repeal of the amount requirement for gen-
eral federal questions. 14O Third, lawyers and judges have formed the
habit of invoking the particular statute which, logic impels, should
control over the general. Fourth, while the "arising under" test is
analytically the same in the two categories, I cannot help but believe
that when a court is asked to consider a case under a particular statu-
tory grant there is somewhat more hydraulic pressure toward finding
jurisdiction than there is under the general provision. 141 Fifth, some
special federal question jurisdictions go further, upon some research,
than might be thought possible upon first reading. They thus provide
a broader access to federal court. For example, suppose two private
pleasure boats collide during a weekend skiing or fishing outing, caus-
ing serious personal injury and property damage. Is the subsequent
negligence suit "[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction"
under section 1333(1)1 Yes, the Supreme Court said, so long as the
accident occurs on navigable waters. 142
138. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 17, at 91 n.3 (4th ed. 1983) (statutes
granting jurisdiction without regard to amount have lost significance).
139. See Luneberg, Justice Rehnquist. Statutory Interpretation. the Policies o/Clear State-
ment. and Federal Jurisdiction. 58 IND. L.J. 211, 228 (1982).
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (statutes regulating commerce); see also Overnite Transp.
Co. v. Chicago Indus. Tire Co., 668 F.2d 274, 276 (7th Cir. 1981) (certain actions under
Interstate Commerce Act require $40,000 amount in controversy).
141. But see C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 17, at 91 n.3 (4th ed. 1983) (aris-
ing under has same meaning in special statutes as in section 1331).
142. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 676 (1982) (all vessels commer-
cial or noncommercial subject to federal admiralty jurisdiction); see also Camilla & Drzal,
Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson: I/This Is Water. It Must Be Admiralty. 59 WASH. L. REV. I,
17 (1983). See generally Hill & Baker, Dam Federal Jurisdiction!. 32 EMORY L.J. 3, 26-27
(1983) (Foremost's extension of admiralty jurisdiction perceived as serious "erosion of federal-
ism"). There are some limits to this principle. See Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. v. Coastal
States Gas Producing Co., 644 F.2d 1132, 1135 (5th Cir.) (extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1982), is not an automatic grant of jurisdiction), cert. denied. 454 U.S.
1081 (1981).
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In any event, the special federal question statutes should not be
overlooked. A partial list of examples from Title 28 discloses their
breadth: section 1333 (admiralty); section 1337 (statutes regulating
commerce); section 1338 (patents); section 1339 (postal matters); sec-
tion 1343 (civil rights); section 1344 (election disputes); section 1352
(federal bonds); and section 1346 (U.S. as defendant)}43 Addition-
ally, specific grants of jurisdiction are sprinkled throughout the sub-
stantive statutes. 144 Any of them can be an entree to the federal
forum.
THRUST: There is a statute depriving the federal court of
jurisdiction.
PARRY: Argue that this case does not fall within the statutory
prohibition. Two provisions are commonly invoked. 145 First, 28
143. The following statutes also appear in 28 U.S.C.:
§ 1334 (bankruptcy matters and proceedings; after 1984 this will cover only bankruptcy
appeals).
§ 1336 (review of certain ICC orders).
§ 1340 (internal revenue; customs duties).
§ 1350 (alien's action for tort).
§ 1351 (actions against consuls, vice consuls, and members of a diplomatic mission).
§ 1364 (certain suits by the Senate or a committee thereof-this is one of three sections
numbered § 1364).
§ 1352 (actions on bonds executed under federal law).
§ 1353 (cases involving Indian land allotments).
§ 1355 (actions to recover fines, penalties, or forfeitures incurred under federal law).
§ 1356 (seizures not within admiralty jurisdiction).
§ 1357 (injuries under certain federal laws).
§ 1362 (federal question actions by certain Indian tribes).
§ 1363 (actions to protect juror's employment rights).
A number of sections of 28 U.S.C. also grant jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of cases to which the United States is a party:
§ 1345 (United States as plaintift).
§ 1346 (United States as defendant).
§ 1347 (partition actions where United States is joint tenant).
§ 1348 (actions by United States to wind up national banking associations).
§ 1349 (actions by or against corporations where United States owns more than one-half
of the stock).
§ 1358 (eminent domain).
§ 1361 (action in nature of mandamus against a government officer or agency).
144. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982) (Securities and Exchange Act of 1934); 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) (1982) (Social Security Act). See generally Jacobs, Procedural Matters in Actions
Brought Under Rule lOb-5, 27 N.Y.L. SeH. L. REv. 361, 365-70 (1981) (discussion of subject
matter and personal jurisdiction).
145. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (Tax Injunction Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982) (Johnson
Act); see also Note, The Johnson Act - A Return to State Independence, 30 ILL. L. REv. 215 J.
D. (1935) (review of first three cases decided under Johnson Act); Comment, Limitation of
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U.S.C. § 1342 deprives the district courts of jurisdiction to enjoin the
effect of any order of a state agency affecting public utility rates, if,
and only if: (1) jurisdiction is based on diversity or a federal question
arising under the Constitution; (2) the challenged rate order does not
frustrate interstate commerce; (3) the rate order was preceded by a
reasonable notice and hearing; and (4) there is an effective remedy in
state court. Second, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 prohibits an injunction against
the assessment or collection of any state tax if an effective remedy in
state court exists. 146 The strength of such provisions is easily used
against their application. Their particularity means that if any of the
identified conditions is missing the statute has no force or effect.
Some research leavened with persuasion shows how the particular suit
does not fit the bar and should go forward. 147
V. CONCLUSION
What should we make of all these thrusts and parries?
My theme has been that federal jurisdiction is complicated, sophis-
ticated, and theoretical. We should expect that from a legal specialty
which deals with such important issues of federalism. The litigator
must be equal to that challenge. The crafty procedualist uses that
sophistication and complexity to advantage. In this, as in the rest of
the trial arts, one must strive for mastery. One of Aesop's Fables best
describes what is at stake:
A swallow hatched her brood under the eaves of a Court of Justice.
Before her young could fly, a serpent crept out of his hole and ate all the
nestlings. When the poor bird returned and found her nest empty, she
began a pitiable wailing. Another swallow suggested, by way of com-
fort, that she was not the first bird who had lost her young. 'True,' she
replied, 'but it is not only for my little ones that I mourn, but that I
should have been wronged in that very place where the injured fly for
justice.'148
Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction Over Public Utility Rate Cases. 44 YALE L.J. 119 (1934)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1342). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 51, at
299·300 (4th ed. 1983) (discussing statutory restrictions on injunctions).
146. See 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1982) (barring injunctions against the collection of federal
taxes).
147. See 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE §§ 4236, 4237 (1978) (Johnson Act and Tax Injunction Act may be used as effective
method of gaining access to federal forum).
148. Adapted from AESOP WITHOUT MORALS 188 (L. Daly trans. 1961).
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A lawyer pleading into federal court may resemble our swallow.
He brings his client's suit in federal court seeking a juster justice.
Principles of federal jurisdiction, however, may play the role of the
serpent. Often, all is lost without even the opportunity to argue the
merits of the cause. In this essay I have highlighted some special
ways to get into and to stay in federal court once that forum has been
chosen over state court. These are some ways, in short, to build your
nest out of the serpent's reach. 149
149. Even if the nest is within reach, the serpent will lose to a sly mongoose:
At the hole where he went in
Red-Eye called to Wrinkle-Skin.
Hear what little Red-Eye saith:
'Nag, come up and dance with deathl'
Eye to eye and head to head,
(Keep the measure, Nag.)
This shall end when one is dead;
(At thy pleasure, Nag.)
Tum for tum and twist for twist -
(Run and hide thee, Nag.)
Habl The hooded Death has missedl
(Woe betide thee, Nagl)
R. Kipling, "Rikki-Tikki-Tavi," THE CoLLECTED WORKS OF RUDYARD KIPLiNG, vol. xi at
245 (1970 ed.).
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